The intelligence failure behind the midterms
By Meda Parameswara ReddyGasoline, tariffs, and the immigration crackdown...fine, but this problem is going unnoticed.

Intelligence Engine
The postmortems on the midterms have settled on the usual suspects: gasoline, tariffs, and the immigration crackdown. Follow the gas price back to its source, though, and the trail ends in an unexpected place: an intelligence estimate about what Iran would do once the bombs began to fall.
The war opened with a military feat few would have predicted. On Feb. 28, U. S. and Israeli strikes killed Iran’s supreme leader and dismantled its air defenses within hours. Then Tehran changed the game. It closed the Strait of Hormuz to most foreign shipping and launched waves of cheap drones at its neighbors. A gallon of regular that cost less than $3 in February cost $4.48 by May. On Election Day, 87 percent of voters said fuel costs concerned them, and 62 percent held the president responsible for high prices.
In RealClearMarkets, I argued that the strait matters less to the world economy than most people think, because markets reroute and adapt. I still believe that. But voters do not read shipping data. They read the sign at the gas station, the one price nearly every American sees every week. Democrats and much of the press made that sign the scoreboard of the war, and in politics, perception is reality.
The first miss was Hormuz itself. The closure was not unthinkable; the Revolutionary Guards had rehearsed it openly, and the White House said the Pentagon had planned for it for decades. Planners simply judged it unlikely, on the theory that Tehran would never wreck its own oil revenue.
The second miss was the drones. Iran’s Shahed drones, built at home from cheap dual-use parts, cost an estimated $30,000 to $50,000 each, whereas a single interceptor can cost ten times that or more. One analyst calculated that the United Arab Emirates spends $20 to $28 to stop every dollar Iran spends attacking it. A CSIS researcher said U. S. planners seemed to assume that such drones were “unique to the Ukrainian battlefield,” even after three years of watching Russia use Iranian designs against Kyiv.
The third miss was the target list. Iran aimed 83 percent of its missiles and drones at Gulf states rather than Israel, more than 4,000 by late March, striking all six Gulf monarchies. The United Arab Emirates alone absorbed over 2,000. A strategy built on punishing Iran assumed that Iran would answer Israel and Washington. It answered the world’s energy supply instead.
All three misses share one root cause: American analysts judged Iran through American eyes. In a democracy, a government that wrecks its own economy is voted out, so our planners assumed that Tehran would avoid doing so. A dictatorship that jails its critics and shoots its protesters does not weigh its people’s suffering that way. As I argued in RealClearDefense, intelligence keeps getting blindsided because it projects Western logic onto adversaries who do not share it. Understanding an enemy’s operating system is not sympathy. It is the core of the job.
Some will blame the policymakers who reportedly heard warnings and set them aside. But a warning that can be filed away as a mere “possibility” has not done its work.
For risks that can reshape the world, I have argued for a Thirteen-Sigma standard — roughly one failure in 100 trillion. In medical diagnostics, the tools for chasing that kind of reliability are fishbone diagrams and failure mode and effects analysis. Every possible cause is listed, then scored for severity, likelihood, and detectability. A failure mode with catastrophic severity is never dismissed because someone finds it improbable. Run Hormuz through that discipline, and it lands near the top of the list, because the likelihood score would have come from an honest reading of Tehran, not from American assumptions.
Artificial intelligence can now sift billions of data points, and I have argued that the Pentagon must lead in using it. But a model that starts from the premise that Iran will not hurt itself will confirm that premise faster, not correct it. Data cannot fix a bad assumption. Only analysts who understand the adversary can.
The opening strikes on Iran were a triumph of capability. What followed was a failure of imagination, and American families paid for it at the pump. Our weapons are held to standards of precision measured in feet. Our estimates of the enemy deserve the same rigor, because when they miss, the bill eventually reaches every voter.
Image: Ninara via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0.
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