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August 10, 2026Substack.com

A Century of Humiliation: The Myth That Made Modern China — with Alice Miller

Former CIA China analyst Alice Miller challenges the Fairbank-era narrative framing modern China as revolutionary reaction to 1840's Opium War humiliation. She argues the modern Chinese state grew from centuries of commercial expansion and military-driven bur…

A Century of Humiliation: The Myth That Made Modern China — with Alice Miller

Intelligence Engine

Alice Miller at her house o March 6, 2025, taken by Liu HeIf you ever studied modern Chinese history, you likely met the “century of humiliation” in your first class. In 1840, British gunboats shattered the pride and legitimacy of the Qing empire, and the decades of semi-colonization that followed inaugurated a century of reform and revolution — all aimed at restoring an ancient, creaky civilization to unity and to the top of the world. The Kuomintang and the Communist Party told the same story and drew the same conclusion: the mandate belongs to whoever ends the humiliation. In China, history has never been merely academic. Where elections do not exist, leaders seek legitimacy in historical title deeds — which is why the Party still teaches the story in every classroom and invokes it in every speech on national rejuvenation. The battle crossed the Pacific, too. John King Fairbank absorbed the nationalist framework in wartime China and canonized it at Harvard, organizing American understanding of modern China around two dates: 1840 and 1949. He built the field of China studies as we know it, and generations of his students inherited the framework with it, until American scholarship was teaching China’s nationalist mythology back to itself — and to Washington, where it still underwrites op-eds casting Xi Jinping as the new emperor. How America tells China’s story shapes how America makes China policy. Dr. Alice Miller thinks we have the story wrong. From 1974 to 1990, she was a senior CIA analyst of Chinese foreign policy and domestic politics, and later a division chief supervising analysis of China, North Korea, Indochina, and Soviet policy in East Asia. She is now a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, where she edited and contributed to the China Leadership Monitor from 2001 to 2018. She published as H. Lyman Miller before her gender transition. In part two of our conversation — edited for clarity and brevity — we trace her formation at Princeton under Fritz Mote, the ferocious “Who lost China?” debates of the 1950s, the eternal feud between historians and political scientists, and her heterodox verdict on engagement: it didn’t fail — it worked so well that Xi Jinping had to stomp on it. We close with a story of a different kind: her transition in 2006, and the unexpected grace with which the CIA, Hoover, and the Naval Postgraduate School received it. Part one, on her years decoding Beijing for the CIA, is here. Enjoy! LeoRefer a friendMusic: Carnaval Op. 9 No. 18 - “Aveu”, Bishara Haroni, Artlist Classics, Robert SchumannFor quick navigation to the specific sections:Early sinologist debates about “who lost China?”The fallacy of “The Century of Humiliation”The battle between historians and political scientists over contemporary China studies“How Did We Get China So Wrong?”An identity transition from Harold to AliceLast time we spoke about your job analyzing Chinese politics for the CIA. This time, I’d like to talk about your academic career and your views on how American scholars have analyzed China. You began studying China in the 1960s at Princeton. How did you develop your interest in Chinese empires? I blame [Princeton sinologist] Fritz Mote. He co-taught the original Chinese language courses, but he also taught the courses on the later empires. His courses were just fascinating. The impression you get from basic textbooks is, “If you’ve seen one dynasty, you’ve seen them all,” because of the dynastic cycle. But when you actually take the dynasties apart and look at their events and trends, it doesn’t look like that at all. The really big trends are not the changes of dynasties. There are longer trends in society and economy that transcend the dynasties. For example, in the middle of the Tang, in the eighth century, a fundamental shift in taxation began to break the aristocratic system of land ownership, and created a situation that led to what flourished in the Song. Once you begin to see those things, it’s just endlessly fascinating. You studied China in an era when the “Great Men of China studies” such as Mote and John Fairbank were still around. Could you talk about them? Fairbank is one of the great founders of China studies. He did a lot to help establish it in the wake of World War II and the Communist Revolution in China. You also had Theodore de Bary at Columbia; Mote; Franz Michael from University of Washington — he was my mentor in graduate school; Arthur Wright at Yale, although his reputation is overblown —  his wife, Mary Wright, was much more important; Joseph Levenson and Robert Scalapino at Berkeley; and Benjamin Schwartz at Harvard. History isn’t a bigger and bigger pile of facts. It’s a conversation. What distinguished them? Were they in some sort of debate with each other over topics and methods? The most important debates were among people who worked on contemporary China. People at Harvard, like Schwartz and Fairbank, had built up an interpretation of the 1949 revolution as reflecting the outgrowth of trends from the 19th century and Chinese social history. And so in that sense, the Communist Revolution was more Chinese than it was inspired by the Soviet Union. Others, like Franz Michael, argued that the Communist Revolution reflected Soviet influence. They disagreed with Fairbank, and argued that this foreign impact and the roots of the communist movement are more important than the emphases that Fairbank, and people like him, focused on. That debate was important because it fit into a broader political debate in the United States. The Republicans gained control of Congress in 1948, and began to make China policy an issue to attack the Truman administration with. When the revolution succeeded, the question “Who lost China?” became important in American politics. Fairbank argued that the United States didn’t have China to lose, and besides, it’s a Chinese revolution. The other side argued that the U. S. did lose China by failing to recognize how it was really a revolution supported by the Soviet Union — this is as the Cold War was getting going. Those academic debates were ferocious, and continued on through the 1950s into the early ‘60s. By that time, everybody was tired of it. Then, in 1964-’65, American involvement in Vietnam started, and the lessons of China’s revolution became important for understanding the Vietnamese revolution. All those arguments came back again. The period before modern times was still underdeveloped. There just weren’t that many people working on it. It took until the early ‘60s for there to be a substantial textbook on Chinese history for traditional times. Fairbank wrote it with Edwin Reischauer and Albert Craig. That was the textbook I used in my first course on traditional Chinese history. The kinds of debates that infect contemporary China studies didn’t figure much in earlier periods. Nobody knew enough about Han times or the origins of the Qin empire to have major differences. How do you evaluate Fairbank’s legacy? His views influenced politics, and he has a huge lineage of academic offspring now all over American universities. Intellectually and sociologically, there are reasons to be critical. Some of his scholarship hasn’t stood up well. He was responsible for helping to introduce foundational knowledge about China. But as later generations came, they were naturally going to revise and reinterpret and criticize what was there sat down by him. That’s true of everybody. History isn’t a bigger and bigger pile of facts. It’s a conversation. I’m critical of some of Fairbank’s views, intellectually. He is the progenitor of the standard story of modern Chinese history organized around two dates: 1840, for the Opium War, and 1949, the Communist Revolution. I’m trying to write a book now that offers a different story of how we get to the China of today. It’s an effort to try to reinterpret the rise of the modern Chinese state, from about 1550 down to the present. The conventional interpretation is: it’s a revolutionary reaction to the intrusion of the West in 1840 with the Opium War. The Opium War demonstrated that traditional Chinese politics could not be an effective basis for adaptation to the modern world created by the West, and so their tradition had to be abandoned. They had to establish a new way of doing things, and, therefore, they required a revolution, and that’s what the communists represent.[This interpretation includes that] despite being a revolutionary regime, the People’s Republic in many ways continues many of the characteristics of the imperial regime. Mao Zedong looks like an emperor. The Chinese communist bureaucracy looks like the Confucian bureaucracy. Contemporary Chinese foreign policy really wants to restore the old tribute system of foreign relations. If we think of it in the wrong terms, we’ll formulate wrong policy. It’s that simple. The tianxia, all under heaven, system. Yeah, that’s the standard story. My book tries to do something different, and argue that the modern Chinese state really is revolutionary. It’s a product of two major trends. One is the rise of commerce and merchants from 1550 through the Qing and up into the 19th and 20th centuries. If you study Western history, or Japanese history in the Tokugawa period, merchants are a revolutionary class in creating a different political order. How does that play out in China? The other major trend is the advances in military technology and the way wars are fought. They require a much more powerful state to get the money to pay for the army and the weapons that they use. They need a stronger bureaucracy, and they need some way of extracting resources and people out of society that are just tremendously different from the way traditional imperial regimes worked. I argue that the imperial system was being hollowed out by the rise of commerce and the consequent rise of population. The local districts governed six or seven times the number of people in 1900 compared to 1550. The problems of government are much more complicated, and merchants are becoming active. They’re the main force in the 1911 revolution, and they continued to be important through the republican period. The Nanjing period, under the old interpretation, looks like a failure — bad leadership, corruption, and so forth. Nobody wanted to study it. But more recently people in the U. S. have begun to reexamine that, and it becomes more and more clear that what Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing Republic tried to do is build a more powerful state, a halfway step toward what the People’s Republic developed. It had a party army. It was a party-driven state. It had a state ideology, the sanmin zhuyi (The Three Principles of the People). It was the inventor of the danwei (unit) system of organising industries. Looked at in that context, it’s not that far from the People’s Republic. All of these comparisons that people draw — “Xi Jinping is like an emperor” — you see this all the time in American publications. It’s just ridiculous. He’s so much more powerful than any Ming emperor. As a consequence of that, my argument is politics and the nature of the state in the People’s Republic period doesn’t look anything at all like government and politics did in, say, the 16th century under the Ming. All of these comparisons that people draw — “Xi Jinping is like an emperor” — you see this all the time in American publications. It’s just ridiculous. He’s so much more powerful than any Ming emperor. The nature of foreign relations under the People’s Republic since 1971 is so thoroughly based on nation-state sovereignty that this idea that they’re trying to rebuild the tianxia system is just ridiculous. If you look at Xi Jinping’s speeches on this — “community of common destiny,” that all the world should be organised — he’s talking about equality among civilizations. That’s not traditional, that’s based on nation-state sovereignty. I know there are Chinese intellectuals who like to talk about tianxia, but I don’t see any reflection of that in what Beijing says. So the Century of Humiliation is not a communist invention, but actually a nationalist invention. Both of those parties share that same line of argument. They just disagree about who’s the real inheritor of Sun Yat-sen’s ideology. Fairbank was in China during the ‘30s and ‘40s. I think he just inherited it, and so did most Americans for a long period of time. The generations of scholars that Fairbank and others taught basically repeated that framework. But more recently, some people have begun raising questions about that, and I’m one of them. I’m skeptical of it. I don’t think that’s the right way to understand contemporary China. That’s what my book’s about. Why does it matter, essentially? It matters in trying to understand from a proper perspective what China is today. It doesn’t look to me like a traditional empire or a dynastic regime. It looks like a modern state in many respects, and has many of the same capabilities. And if we think of it in the wrong terms, we’ll formulate wrong policy. It’s that simple. That’s why it’s important. And the legacy of the republican period is quite complicated because you have the pro-democratic strand, which historians are trying to excavate to show, actually, China could have been set on a different path. Yes, absolutely. But there were also autocratic trends, which obviously the Communist Party embraced and magnified. Those are also part of the republican period. I blame Japan. If the Japanese hadn’t invaded, I doubt that the communists could have defeated the Kuomintang. If you look at 1936, the Kuomintang was getting stronger. They were finally beginning to assert better control of different regions of China that they couldn’t at the beginning, in 1928. The pressure from Japan forced a militarized politics on the Kuomintang regime. Mao Zedong personally thanked the Japanese prime minister for fighting the nationalists. In 1936, at the end of the Long March, the communists were in real trouble. They were vastly reduced in numbers. Chiang was beginning to get ready to launch a sixth campaign to wipe out the communists. It could have been quite different. I presume that, coming from a background in history, your natural intellectual instinct would be to dive into longer-term trends, but then, working on contemporary politics, everything is the now and the future. Did you ever have a sense of frustration as a result? Yes. I usually say that I work on contemporary affairs for money, but I work on long-term history for love. Many people who study contemporary China, both in government but also in academia, are political scientists. I’m critical of political scientists. I think it’s a fraud, and I complain about it all the time. I have good friends who are political scientists, and we have fun ridiculing each other. The standard joke is: You put a collection of political scientists in a room and they’ll talk all day without ever touching a fact. And if you’ve got a bunch of historians in a room, they’ll talk all day and never come up with a theory. There’s just a basic divide. Sounds like you should put them all in the same room. Yeah. They don’t get along well. For political scientists, 1949 is the key date. But if you look at it from a historical pattern, you have to look at the republican period and even elements in the later Qing period to understand how we got here. I am critical of many of the things that contemporary specialists in government think. They think they have a good understanding of what happened in traditional times. But scholarship on traditional times in the United States has gone so much further from when they were in graduate school and might have taken a single course on China from the Neolithic period down to 1900. What they understand is both old and based on conventional understanding, and it’s just been completely overthrown by recent generations of people who specialize in traditional times. People in government still ask me, “Don’t you think the tributary system is what Xi Jinping has in mind?” and, “Don’t you think that Xi Jinping really looks like an emperor?” — simple ideas like that. It’s exasperating. They think they understand traditional Chinese history, but they don’t know anything. After you left the CIA, you first went to Johns Hopkins, and then in 1999 moved to the Hoover Institution at Stanford and worked on the China Leadership Monitor. What was the original design of the China Leadership Monitor? Mike Oksenberg noticed correctly that nobody was paying attention to Chinese leadership politics. It’s a hard field. The information is not easy to get. He thought there ought to be attention to leadership politics, especially as it pertained to specific policy areas. The original Monitor scheme was, I would edit and run it, and there would be five other people in specific areas. The idea was the same person would write in each area, four times a year. I preferred to get people who had government or think-tank experience. Academics are going to write about their political theories. Nobody’s interested in that. Who was the Leadership Monitor targeted at? We wanted to focus on the foreign policy community — I ran ads for it in Foreign Affairs, the Council on Foreign Relations journal — and especially people in government. I had money to take trips to Washington to talk to people in the intelligence community, at State, at Congress. Did you meet anyone interesting at Stanford, especially from China? Occasionally. One of the most interesting people was secretary to first Zhao Ziyang, then Jiang Zemin, and then Hu Jintao. He wrote speeches for all three leaders. I can’t think of his name. He was a well-connected person, obviously. And it was obvious that you could get him to talk about these things and then he’d just stop because it got too sensitive. My rule of thumb has always been, anybody who tells you they know what’s going on in the Politburo obviously doesn’t know. Except this guy. He did know, but he wouldn’t talk about it, except in careful circumstances. It’s the same in Washington politics. All sorts of people will tell you, “I know what’s going on in the Oval Office.” They have no idea. Anybody who tells you they know what’s going on in the Politburo obviously doesn’t know. Then methodologically, how can you know, especially from afar? You’re running the China Leadership Monitor. You have to figure out a way to get close to the truth. We use the traditional Kremlinological methods that I talked about before. There’s no question about the authenticity of what’s said in People’s Daily. It’s official. You can count on it. It doesn’t matter if it’s true or not. What matters is: How does what they’re saying change over time in response to contemporary situations? Did you know the people of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars [a group founded initially to oppose the Vietnam War, which later supported re-establishing U. S.-China relations]? I knew some of them. I didn’t agree with their perspective. I thought they were unrealistic. I thought the Vietnam War was a mistake. Taking part in a nationalistic war is a losing struggle, because you’re fighting a people who are politically aroused and will do anything to save their country. But I did think the Soviet Union was dangerous. I was not sympathetic to the People’s Republic. I loved China and its history, and Chinese people were great. I just didn’t think the regime was something to be admired. Because of the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution, they just appeared grotesque to me. The question of the Cultural Revolution, Great Leap Forward, and to what extent did the American intellectual community and policy community know about them, interests me. Not many people paid attention to the Great Leap, but in the agency we knew about it. Refugees came into Hong Kong and they would tell stories about people eating soil or eating grass, because there was no other food. Or eating each other. It was terrible. I remember people bringing that up in the later ‘60s when I was in graduate school. Some of the left-wing people said, “Oh, that’s just propaganda. It’s not true.”Propaganda by whom? By right-wingers in the United States. I’m not a right-winger, but I am trying to be realistic and calculate foreign policy based on realism, what’s in the best interest of all sides. Those kinds of debates were just, for me, off-putting. Many people were interested in the Cultural Revolution. The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars-types thought this was a great thing that Americans could learn from. I remember when Nixon went to China in February ‘72, the American media went with him. They were talking about the first night in Beijing and it snowed. People came out of their houses to sweep the streets clean of snow. And all these commentators said, “Oh, what a great civic spirit the Chinese have. This is something we should all learn from in our society” — not recognizing that this was enforced by the regime. There’s the saying that Soviet scholars hate Russia and China scholars love China. I had a lot of colleagues who worked on the Soviet Union when I was in the agency, and they all detested the Soviet Union. One of the standard jokes was, “If you’re going to major in Soviet studies or contemporary China studies, do China because Russian food is terrible and Chinese food is outstanding. At least you get to eat well.”I’m constantly wondering about how to understand America’s shift in attitudes towards China, both in engaging with China, and now in shifting to decoupling. Engagement started with Nixon. It was built on a strategic foundation, not economic: collaboration against the Soviet Union. At a time when the U. S. thought the Soviet Union’s power was rising and America’s was declining. There was a convergence of interest between Beijing and Washington that Mao, Nixon, and Kissinger recognised. Up through that time, the academic attitudes towards China were romantic and excited, because now people who had been studying China for years could actually go to China. A lot of people thought Mao was a great revolutionary — all that kind of baloney. Finally the party’s own criticism of Mao in ‘80 and ‘81 meant that a lot of academics said, “Oh, maybe Mao wasn’t so great after all.” That introduced a dose of skepticism. But that didn’t really dent the excitement of working in China. China was joining the world economically, and the U. S. was backing it. ‘89 was a shock, but it was only temporary. For the business community, engagement continued. What really caused the change, as far as I can tell, was the change under the Xi Jinping administration, which surprised many. People were thinking, “Xi is a reformer.” In some sense he is, he did try to change the system for the better. But what’s the standard for better? More control, more stability. The lessons of the Soviet collapse were really relevant and that’s why Xi Jinping keeps pounding on that. Engagement was working so well that Xi Jinping had to stomp on it. Why do China specialists in America keep coming back to the question, “How do we get China so wrong?” That seemed to be the question after the Cultural Revolution, right? It’s hard to get China right, and China changes sometimes in shocking ways. It seems that there repeatedly were big calls that were wrong — the nature of Mao’s regime, where the ‘80s would go, the fact that Xi Jinping turned out not to be a reformer. If you were paying attention in ‘08 and ‘09 and ‘10, you could see tensions, problems the leadership was facing. It wasn’t that surprising, especially when you read that report that Hu Jintao delivered at the 18th Party Congress. How come so few foresaw the rise of Xi Jinping, and that Xi Jinping shocked so many? I wrote an article on the Monitor, which showed that Xi and Li Keqiang were both appointed to the standing committee in that year at the 17th Congress. But if you looked at what Xi and Li were doing, Li was being prepared to become prime minister. Xi was doing stuff that you’d expect from a successor to the party leadership. And so, a lot of us thought Xi was going to be the general secretary. People who didn’t follow the internal politics of the party closely in those days were the ones who were surprised. People in the business community, for example, were really taken aback, especially after the reform policies didn’t really go anywhere and the corruption campaigns expanded. The turn in the American business community was really decisive. From your perspective, would it have been better if engagement didn’t happen, if Nixon choked off the Communist Party and never gave it a lifeline after the Cultural Revolution? Nope. The whole American approach in the ‘50s and ‘60s was just wrong. I agree with George Kennan. He said that the failure to recognize Beijing in 1949, ‘50 was one of the greatest mistakes in American foreign policy. You want to have influence, you have to be there. And trying to isolate China, as the U. S. did fairly vigorously for 20 years, creates more problems than it solves. China wasn’t going to break under Mao, and in fact, they developed nuclear weapons on their own after the Soviets left. Times were not good and it was a poor country, but it was going to survive. The changes that came from engagement since just before Mao died have been positive. Do you think today’s debate is just a variant of the “Who lost China?” debate? Maybe not consciously, but in terms of the sort of dynamics, the questions being asked. It’s more fundamental: Who’s our enemy now? Who’s threatening us now? The Soviet Union has gone. Who’s the next big kid to worry about? My view is: Engagement worked. It was doing exactly what people said. It was creating a more vibrant and successful and prosperous and freer society in a lot of ways under Jiang Zemin and into Hu Jintao’s period. But it created political conditions for a reversal in China, and that surprised everybody. My conclusion wasn’t that engagement failed. It was working so well that Xi Jinping had to stomp on it, which is what he’s been doing. But it created disappointment in this country. Meanwhile, as China’s capabilities have grown, its economy has grown, its military capabilities have evolved, people outside China studies said, “Oh, this is a big country and it looks like it’s powerful. We need a new enemy, and we’ve got one. It’s China.”All kinds of people who weren’t China specialists jumped onto it and have discredited engagement as an approach, and advocated for much tougher containment-type policies. They’re constantly misreading what the Chinese say. There’s a kind of unreality to aspects of the consensus approach in Washington these days toward China. That’s, from a longer-term perspective, counterproductive. It’s hard to get China right, and China changes sometimes in shocking ways. I support engagement because I don’t think the United States can change China, but the Chinese people can. What sorts of policies will support that? Cutting off contacts with Chinese society through containment policies makes it easy for the regime to say, “All our problems are the goddamn Americans’ fault because they’re trying to contain us.”Engagement and contacts with Chinese society of all sorts — artistic and academic and economic and so forth — builds constituencies in China that have an interest in positive relationships with the West. And they will, to the degree that they can, try to influence the direction of politics and the regime to liberalise it, and they offer the best possibility of political change. Since the ‘60s, I’ve always supported engagement. To me, it’s the most revolutionary policy. As you spoke, I realized I missed something quite big, which is your transgender story. Did the fact that you changed your gender impact your work at all? I was worried that it would, but it didn’t, at least as far as I know. When I transitioned in 2006, I talked to Jean Oi, who was the head of the East Asian Studies program at Stanford. We went out to lunch. I told her I was going to change my gender. And she said, “Be strong, go for it.” She was very supportive. I thought Hoover, which is quite conservative, would be negative. I went to talk to the executive director in those days, Richard Sousa. He said, “I know it’s a big step for you, but it’s not for Hoover. You’re not the first to transition here.” They were fine with it. They changed the name on my office door the very next day I went to the office. And finally, I was teaching at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. That’s an American military institution. I thought surely I would be fired. These were the days of “don’t ask, don’t tell” for gay people. And trans people, I could imagine, would be even less acceptable. But I told the department chairman, and he said, “Let me check it out with human resources.” I got a call about three days later from the school’s human resource people, and they said, “How can we help? You’re not the first to transition here. And let’s work out how this will play out.”My big concern was it would affect my livelihood and my jobs, and in all cases it went fine. I was shocked. A lot of times it doesn’t go well for people. So I’m grateful. Did you ever have problems in terms of your transition with others? It seems to me the Chinese community can be somewhat transphobic. Nobody. I haven’t experienced a negative experience from anybody. I have given talks at the CIA. I had a contract for a while to go give talks on what I thought was going on. This was when I was leading the China Leadership Monitor. They had no problem at all with it anymore. When I first worked for them, if you were gay — and nobody knew what trans was in those days — they thought you’d be blackmailable. They finally figured out that you’re only blackmailable if you’re secretive about your gender or gayness. And now, there’s no problem with it. I’ve given talks and walked by the employee activities bulletin board, and there’s a gay/trans support group operating in the agency. Alice Miller and Richard Wich, 2011, Becoming Asia: Change and Continuity in Asian International Relations since World War II, Stanford University PressAlice Miller, 1996, Science and Dissent in Post-Mao China, University of Washington PressThe Stanford Pride Oral History Project’s interview with Alice MillerChina Leadership MonitorThe Peking Hotel podcast and newsletter are digital publications in which Liu He interviews China specialists about their first-hand experiences and observations from decades past. The project grew out of Liu’s research at Hoover Institution collecting oral history of China experts living in the U. S. Their stories are a reminder of what China used to be and what it is capable of becoming. We also have a Chinese-language Substack. We hope to publish more conversations like this one, so stay tuned! We would like to say thank-you to our supporters, especially to the following people who referred us to great many friends, colleagues and acquaintances:China Books ReviewInitiumBill Bishop & SinocismJordan Schneider & ChinaTalkPC & What’s Happening in China《人文中国》Humanities ChinaThe Goldkorn Newsletter擦星星事务所不如读书Matt Turpin & China ArticlesCareer China NewsletterThe China WeekThe China-MENA NewsletterKudos to you, our network now has more awesome people like yourselves. Please keep spreading the word for us :) I appreciate it. Thanks for reading Peking Hotel! This post is public so feel free to share it. Share

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